American Security Policy and Iran: A New Look
Change Needed in Light of Nuclear Weapons Quest
Aug 11, 2009
In Friedman's op-ed article in the New York Times titled "Sleepless in Tehran" (New York Times 29 Oct. 2008: A27.), he suggests that this current economic crisis, specifically inflation and unemployment, may undermine Iranian leader’s power and popularity making negotiations much more likely. A third intriguing argument that is made is that the new President elect’s name, Barack Hussein Obama, will make it harder for the Islamist extremists to demonize the United States.
Benefits of Cooperation
The first argument presented is obviously a perspective shared by many defensive realists, who are obliged to cooperate. When their security is increased mutual security is reached, or when they stand to gain more relative to the others involved. In this case Friedman is arguing that the time for negotiations is now because Iran is desperate to relieve the several rounds of international sanctions that can no longer be absorbed by inflated oil prices. Therefore the United States, which leads the international coalition responsible for the sanctions, would likely be more successful in persuading Iran’s cooperation to stop enrichment or to abandon a nuclear program altogether.
Initiation by Iran
In Friedman’s second argument he suggests that the Iranians, in light of the recent drop in crude oil priced, initiate negotiations with the United States. Friedman argues that the government of Iran has not been as successful as they would like their public to think. He says that while oil prices were high these deficiencies, such as 30 % inflation or 11% unemployment, could be absorbed and hidden. But now that the excess money has stopped, there will be questions about how well they are really governing which could lead to a push to relieve the UN imposed sanctions and maybe even a change in power. The extremist ideas of the Iranian leaders will likely be undermined and influenced by moderates seeking cooperation with the US and its allies.
Iranian Unification
Interestingly, and somewhat contradicting his earlier points, Friedman’s third argument presented in this editorial totally abandons the realist and liberal perspective of the previous two and appeals to the constructivist principle of identity. According to Friedman, Iran has been a relatively simple task of uniting Iranians against “The Great Satan” and its one-sided intentions under the Bush administration. Now they are going to have a harder time convincing their citizens that the United States is this great evil when the president is named Barack Hussein Obama. Freidman claims that since Hussein is the central figure in Shiite Muslim and Obama means, “he is with us,” Iranians will identify more with the US and therefore will not be as quick to label it as the ultimate evil. Also, with the lessening of Iranian negative impressions negotiations may be possible. Unlike the Bush administration, Obama has agreed to meet and speak with Iranian leaders without preconditions. Although hopeful, it seems irresponsible to base so much on a middle name.
Another belief of the realist proponents is that military force is one of the most important bargaining chips in international relations. In the case of Iran, the threat of force can serve some useful deterrence, but at the same time, that fear can also invoke strong nationalism, as it did in the U.S. after 9/11. Bowman suggests that this “fear” of U.S. force supports the Iranian nuclear program and in fact perpetuates itself; by the escalation of U.S. threats the Iranians gain more support for their nuclear program and in turn more threats from the U.S.
A final element undermining prosperous relations among the two countries has been the fact that the Iranians have been convinced that the U.S. is determined to bring about a regime change in Iran. Understandably this makes their government hesitant to enter into a mutually respectful relationship when there are underlying discrepancies from the outset.
Negotiate Common Interests
The final way that the United States might resolve some issues with Iran is, as Roger Cohen suggests, to begin negotiations on common interests and work on the relationship from there. Iran and the US have several shared interests that with mutual cooperation could alleviate some of the issues with the Prisoner’s Dilemma discussed earlier. For example, both countries desire stability in Iraq and permanent removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan. If the two countries can successfully work together on these issues the possibility that future negotiations in regard to more contentious issues will have positive outcomes.
One thing for certain can be concluded: Iran is probably the most difficult U.S. foreign policy issue and clearly cannot be approached by any one school of thought. Both power politics and constructivism, and even liberalism, have useful aspects when dealing with an overwhelming issue such as Iran. Whether it is Brook’s hard-line principle, Cohen’s more cooperative, or Friedman’s ideas about a combination approach; all three have one major element in common. Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons must be an urgent issue for the United States.
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